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LEGAL SHORTS
RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE MONTANA
PRACTITIONER
1. WATKINS V. LACOSTA1
In Stanley L. and Carolyn M. Watkins Trust v. Lacosta
(hereinafter Watkins Trust), the Montana Supreme Court ruled,
in a matter of first impression, that an estate planning attorney
may owe a duty to non-client beneficiaries of an estate plan.
In either late 1991 or early 1992, Carolyn Watkins retained
Susan Lacosta, an estate and tax planning attorney, to draft an
estate plan for Carolyn and her husband Stanley.2 In January
1992, Carolyn and Stanley signed their wills and a Trust
agreement, entitled "The Stanley L. and Carolyn M. Watkins
Revocable Trust Agreement" (the Trust).3 The Trust included a
direct bequest to Steve Williamson, Stanley's stepson, upon the
death of the survivor of Carolyn and Stanley. 4 However, Lacosta
neither discussed the estate plan with Stanley nor did she meet
with him.5 The wills and Trust documents were instead sent
with Carolyn; they were signed outside the presence of the
witnesses and any notary public.6
1. 2004 MT 144, 321 Mont. 432, 92 P.3d 620.
2. Id. 6.
3. Id. 7.
4. Id. 6.
5. Id. 7.
6. Id.
1
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When Stanley died in 1992, his will was admitted to
probate, but Lacosta did not reveal to Carolyn that the will had
not been properly executed pursuant to Montana Code
Annotated section 72-2-522. 7 Lacosta also failed to disclose that
the Trust became irrevocable when Stanley died.8
Stanley's stepson Steve began his own estate planning in
1995, and he met with Lacosta to clarify the Trust's provisions. 9
She informed Steve that the Trust was revocable; however,
Lacosta later informed Carolyn that the Trust was actually
irrevocable. 10 Carolyn eventually contacted another attorney to
inquire about the Trust.11 After spending hours deciphering it,
the attorney determined that there were defects in the estate
plan, and he disclosed this fact to Steve and the other Trust
beneficiaries. 12
Steve was the personal representative of Stanley's estate,
and in 1997 he, both personally and as the personal
representative of Stanley's estate, and the Trust, filed a
complaint against Lacosta for legal malpractice.1 3 They alleged
that Lacosta's actions damaged them because they enabled an
attack on Stanley's will and the Trust.1 4 Lacosta moved for
summary judgment.1 5 The Eleventh Judicial District Court
granted Lacosta's motion on the basis that the statute of
limitations had began running when Stanley's will was admitted
to probate in 1992, and thus the action was untimely.1 6 The
district court also held that the plaintiffs did not have standing,
because they were not Lacosta's clients, and that the action was
barred by res judicata, equitable estoppel, and judicial
estoppel.1 7
Justice James C. Nelson, writing for the court, reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment to Lacosta on de
novo review.' 8 The court first considered whether the appellants
had standing to bring a legal malpractice action against
7. Watkins Trust, 8.
8. Id.
9. Id. 1 10.
10. Id.
11. Id. 9 12.
12. Id. 12-13.
13. Watkins Trust, 14.
14. Id.
15. Id. 1 15.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. 9 16, 54.
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Lacosta. 19 The court acknowledged that since Stanley had been
a client of Lacosta, and because the estate stands in the shoes of
the decedent, Stanley's personal representative had standing to
bring a malpractice action. 2° The court went on to state that
whether the Trust was a client or a non-client beneficiary was a
factual issue that must be determined through trial.21 The court
noted that the Trust may be a client "based upon the legal
services provide by Lacosta to the Trust and its Trustees,
services which involved Trust assets and transactions." 22
Next, the court considered whether Steve, as a non-client
beneficiary, personally had standing to bring a legal malpractice
action against Lacosta. 23 Steve claimed that because he was a
beneficiary of the estate plan, he had standing to bring the
action, even if he was not Lacosta's client. 24 The issue of
whether an attorney owes a non-client beneficiary any duty was
a matter of first impression in Montana.25 The court looked to
other jurisdictions for the majority rule. Those jurisdictions
indicate that named beneficiaries have standing in actions
against drafting attorneys,26 and a "duty to a third party is
implied because that is the mutual intent of the attorney and
client."27
The court also looked at Montana case law and found it to
be consistent with a finding of a duty owed to a non-client. 28
Previous case law recognizes liability to non-clients in other
contexts, including accounting firms and professional engineers
being liable to non-clients.29 Additionally, it was noted that the
Montana Supreme Court has stated in the past that a test
balancing multiple factors may be used "in deciding the duty
owed by attorneys to non-clients in estate planning,"30 which
19. Watkins Trust, 17.
20. Id. T 19 (citing Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612
So.2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993)).
21. Id. 7 20, 23.
22. Id. T 20.
23. Id. T 21.
24. Id.
25. Watkins Trust, 21
26. Id. (citing Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452 (Haw. 2001); 4 RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, § 32.4 (5th ed. 2000)).
27. Id. T 21 (citing 4 MALLEN, supra note 26, § 32.4).
28. Id. 22.
29. Id. (citing Thayer v. Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 793 P.2d 784 (1990); Jim's
Excavating Serv. v. HKM Assoc., 265 Mont. 494, 878 P.2d 248 (1994); Turner v. Kerin &
Assoc., 283 Mont. 117, 938 P.2d 1368 (1997)).
30. Id. (citing Rhode v. Adams, 1998 MT 73, T 17, 288 Mont. 278, 17, 957 P.2d
2005 265
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indicates that such a duty exists. However, whether Steve
actually had standing in Watkins Trust was a factual issue that
must be determined at trial, and therefore the court held that
summary judgment was not allowed. 31
The court also held that this action was not barred by the
statute of limitations. 32  For legal malpractice actions, "the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until both the
'discovery rule' and the 'accrual rule' have been satisfied."33 The
"discovery rule" is set forth in Montana Code Annotated section
27-2-206, and it begins the statute of limitations when the
negligent act is discovered. 34 The "accrual rule" is provided for
in Montana Code Annotated section 27-2-102(1)(a) and (2), and
it begins the statute of limitations when all elements of a claim,
including damages, have occurred. 35 Lacosta argued that the
statute of limitations could begin running no later than 1992,
when Stanley's will was admitted to probate. 36 However, the
court held that the three year statute of limitations did not
begin to run until 1995, and thus this action, filed in 1997, was
executed timely.37 The court came to this conclusion due to the
fact that the appellants incurred no damages until 1995, and
thus the "accrual rule" was not satisfied until that year.38
Regarding the "discovery rule," the court held that summary
judgment would not be appropriate because there were factual
issues to be decided, including the complexity of the Trust,
which may have prevented the appellants from discovering any
defect.3 9
Watkins Trust should cause both estate attorneys and
beneficiaries in Montana to take note. Estate attorneys may
now owe a duty to those other than their clients. This decision
also opens the doors to non-client beneficiaries who seek to
recover damages by alleging negligence against attorneys who
represented the beneficiaries' decedents.
-Kathryn J. Bell
1124, 17).
31. Watkins Trust, 23.
32. Id. 53.
33. Id. 40.
34. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-206 (2003)).
35. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-102(1)(a) and (2)).
36. Id. 50.
37. Watkins Trust, 53.
38. Id. 52.
39. Id. 47.
Vol. 66266
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2. LOCKHEAD V. WEINSTEIN 40
In Lockhead v. Weinstein, the Montana Supreme Court
partially overruled In re Estate of Goick 41 and held that a client
is bound by a settlement agreement entered into by his or her
attorney, even if the agreement is not filed with the clerk of
court or entered upon the court's minutes. 42
After having his federal suit dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, Brian Lockhead sued Debra Weinstein in state
court for defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and actual malice.
43
During a September 23, 2002 telephone conversation, the
parties' attorneys agreed to settle the case.44  Weinstein's
counsel prepared and faxed a proposed release to one of
Lockhead's attorneys two days later. 45 On September 27, 2002,
Lockhead's attorney replied in a letter, stating that they agreed
with the terms of the General Release and that "Brian Lockhead
accepts the settlement offer for the sum of $7,500."46
Weinstein's counsel wrote to Lockhead's counsel on the same
day, stating that he had prepared and signed a stipulation for
dismissal and Ordered a settlement check.47 Two weeks later,
Lockhead's attorney called Weinstein's attorney to advise that
Lockhead refused to settle.48
Weinstein moved to compel settlement. 49 In support, she
submitted her counsel's affidavit, the September 27, 2002
letters, the unsigned general release, a copy of the settlement
check, and the stipulation to dismiss signed by her counsel.
50
The district court granted Weinstein's motion, reasoning that
Lockhead agreed to the terms of the settlement and Montana
Code Annotated section 37-61-401(1) 51 did not apply. 52
40. 2003 MT 360, 319 Mont. 62, 81 P.3d 1284.
41. 275 Mont. 13, 909 P.2d 1165 (1996).
42. Lockhead, 22.
43. Id. 2.
44. Id. 3.
45. Id.
46. Id. 4.
47. Id.
48. Lockhead, 4.
49. Id. 5.
50. Id.
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-401(1) (2001) provides:
(1) An attorney and counselor has the authority to:
(a) bind his client in any steps of an action or proceeding filed with the clerk or
entered upon the minutes of the court and not otherwise;
2005
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On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court agreed with
Weinstein's reliance on Hetherington v. Ford Motor Co. 53 Under
Hetherington, a party to a settlement agreement is bound to the
agreement if he has 1) manifested assent to the agreement's
terms and 2) has not manifested an intent not to be bound by
that assent.54 Lockhead attempted to distinguish Hetherington
because there was no evidence that Lockhead met with his
attorney, authorized him to accept, or wanted to agree.5 5 The
court rejected this argument, noting that Lockhead authorized
his attorney to write "Brian Lockhead accepts" and that his
attorney's September 27 letter indicated that Lockhead reviewed
and approved the general release.56 These facts evidenced both
Lockhead's agreement to the settlement and his attorney's
authority to accept the settlement.5 7
The court also rejected Lockhead's argument that the
September 27 letter was only an "agreement to agree."58  In
Hetherington, the court wrote, "[a] party's latent intention not to
be bound does not prevent the formation of a binding contract." 59
In determining that the agreement in the September 27 letter
was enforceable, the court stated that Lockhead's argument was
"precisely the 'latent intention' argument we rejected in
Hetherington."60
Lockhead also unsuccessfully relied on Bar OK Ranch, Co.
v. Ehlert61 and Marta Corp. v. Thoft. 62 Lockhead relied on both
Bar OK Ranch, Co. and Marta Corp. for the proposition that the
settlement was not enforceable because there was no evidence
that he attended or participated in settlement negotiations.6 3
The Montana Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating
that in both Bar OK Ranch, Co. and Marta Corp. attendance
(b) receive money claimed by his client in an action or proceeding during the
pendency thereof or after judgment unless a revocation of his authority is filed
and, upon the payment thereof and not otherwise, to discharge the claim or
acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment.
52. Lockhead, 5.
53. 257 Mont. 395, 849 P.2d 1039 (1993).
54. Lockhead, 12 (citing Heatherington, 257 Mont. at 397, 849 P.2d at 1042).
55. Id. 12.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. 13.
59. Hetherington, 257 Mont. at 399, 849 P.2d at 1042.
60. Lockhead, 13.
61. 2002 MT 12, 308 Mont. 140, 40 P.3d 378.
62. 271 Mont. 109, 894 P.2d 333 (1995).
63. Lockhead, 9 14-15.
Vol. 66268
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/9
LEGAL SHORTS
and participation in settlement negotiations was only evidence
of an agreement to settle, not a requirement. 64 In this case, the
affidavit of Weinstein's counsel, the September 27 letter from
Lockhead's attorney, and Lockhead's concession that his
attorney spoke on his behalf were evidence of Lockhead's
agreement. 65
Lockhead's final argument was that he was not bound by
the settlement because the settlement agreement was not filed
with the court clerk or entered upon the court's minutes. 66
Lockhead cited Montana Code Annotated section 37-61-401(1)
and In re Estate of Goick67 in support of his argument. 68 In
Goick, the court quoted Montana Code Annotated section 37-61-
401(1) and observed that the settlement agreement at issue in
the case had not been filed with the clerk or entered into the
minutes. 69 Based at least partially on these observations, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to compel
settlement. 70
Here, in rejecting Lockhead's argument, the Montana
Supreme Court noted that its literal interpretation of Montana
Code Annotated section 37-61-401(1) in Goick was inconsistent
with prior case law.71 The court briefly examined the history of
Montana Code Annotated section 37-61-401(1) and concluded
that a literal interpretation of the statute does not make sense
and would lead to absurd results.7 2 As a result, the court
overruled Goick to the extent that it required settlement
agreements to be filed with the clerk or entered into the court's
minutes. 73
In Lockhead, the Montana Supreme Court makes clear that
it is not going to let parties avoid settlement agreements based
on technicalities. The court notes that a literal interpretation of
Montana Code Annotated section 37-61-401(1) would mean that
"an attorney's authority to bind a client would depend entirely
64. Id.
65. Id. 7 14.
66. Id. 16.
67. 275 Mont. 13, 909 P.2d 1165 (1996).
68. Lockhead, 7 16.
69. Goick, 275 Mont. at 23, 909 P.2d at 1171.
70. Id.
71. Lockhead, 7 22.
72. Id. 1 17, 22 (agreeing with the Court's previous statements in State v. Nelson,
251 Mont. 139, 141, 822 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1991); State v. Turlock, 76 Mont. 549, 563, 248
P. 169, 175 (1926); Bush v. Baker, 46 Mont. 535, 546, 129 P. 550, 553-54 (1913)).
73. Id. 22.
2005 269
7
et al.: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
270 MONTANA LAWRE VIEW Vol. 66
on whether the attorney received funds. '74 The court desires to
avoid such absurd results. Now, if a party enters into a
settlement agreement that meets the requirements set forth in
Hetherington and examined in subsequent cases, the party will
be bound by the agreement. Parties cannot escape otherwise
valid settlement agreements simply because they are not filed
with the clerk of court or entered into the court's minutes.
75
- Michael Manning
3. STATE V. STONE76
In a case of first impression, State v. Stone presented three
issues to the Montana Supreme Court. First, whether
preventing needless suffering and death of animals constitutes
an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless search of a
defendant's property. Second, whether the warrantless search
of the defendant's residence was permissible as a probation
search. Finally, whether the district court imposed an illegal
sentence upon the defendant.
Clifford Lee Stone ran an animal zoo, housing several of the
animals in cages on his property. 77 In November 2001, a
neighborhood boy who sporadically helped Stone maintain the
animals ventured on to Stone's property at his behest to help
care for the animals.78 The boy witnessed several dead rabbits
being consumed by other starving rabbits and told his father
what he had seen, prompting the father to contact the sheriffs
office. 79 The responding officers proceeded onto the property and
saw the dead and starving rabbits. 80 Upon further inspection,
the officers discovered dogs and cats without food or water living
in kennels on the premises. 81 The officers became concerned for
the well-being of the animals observing "that the animals were
starving to death."82 After seeing'to the needs of the animals,
the officers were informed that Stone was a probationer and
kept animals inside his residence as well. 83  The officers
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 2004 MT 151, 321 Mont. 489, 92 P.3d 1178
77. Id. 97 5-6.
78. Id. 97 7-8.
79. Id. 7 8-9.
80. Id. 1 9.
81. Id.
82. Stone, 10.
83. Id. 97 10-11.
8
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contacted Stone's probation officer and were given permission to
enter the house.8 4 The officers entered the house and assisted
the remaining animals.8 5
Stone was charged with four felony counts of animal cruelty,
one misdemeanor count of animal cruelty and one misdemeanor
count of child endangerment.8 6 The trial court denied Stone's
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his
property on the grounds that it was an unreasonable search and
seizure.8 7
In resolving whether the exigent circumstances exception
applies to situations of threats to animal life, the Montana
Supreme Court looked to the law of other states and determined
that several jurisdictions had applied the exception in similar
situations.88 The court found that the officers were acting out of
concern for the welfare of the animals.8 9 This finding was
followed by an examination of the animal cruelty statute as it
read at the time of the violation.90 The court determined that
Montana has a strong public policy to aid animals mistreated by
people and that this policy is exemplified through the legislative
history of Montana Code Annotated section 45-8-211 and the
legislature's subsequent adoption of further animal protection
measures. 91  The court concluded that "the prevention of
needless suffering and death of the animals on Stone's property
created exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search
84. Id. T 11.
85. Id.
86. Id. 12.
87. Id.
88. Stone, T 21-31, citing Tuck v. United States, 477 A.2d 1115 (D.C. 1984); State
v. Bauer, 379 N.W.2d 895 (Wis. 1985); People v. Thornton, 676 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 1997);
Pine v. State, 889 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, Pine v. Texas, 516 U.S.
914 (1995).
89. Id. 33.
90. Id. 35, (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-211(1)(b), (c)(i)-(ii) (2001)). The
statute provides in part:
(1) A person commits the offense of cruelty to animals if without justification
the person knowingly or negligently subjects an animal to mistreatment or
neglect by:
(b) carrying or confining any animal in a cruel manner;
(c) failing to provide an animal in the person's custody with:
(i) food and water of sufficient quantity and quality to sustain the
animal's normal health; or ....
(iii) in cases of immediate, obvious, serious illness or injury, licensed
veterinary or other appropriate medical care.
91. Id. 99 36-37.
2005
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for and rescue of the animals. '92 The court held that the trial
court did not err in denying Stone's motion to suppress and that
the officers warrantless entry onto and search of Stone's
property was justified given the exigent circumstances and
probable cause present.93
Noting that Stone was on probation and therefore had a
reduced privacy interest, the court analyzed the search of
Stone's house under the reasonable cause standard for probation
searches. 94 The court found that Stone's probation officer once
summoned to the scene and apprised of the situation had
reasonable cause to believe that Stone was violating his
probation by committing criminal offenses of cruelty to animals
inside his house. 95 Stone's probation officer gave permission to
the law enforcement officers to enter Stone's house and, thus,
the court found the warrantless entry to be a justifiable
probation search.96 The court held that the trial court did not
err in denying Stone's motion to suppress the evidence seized
from his house.97
The State conceded that the sentence imposed on Stone was
illegal, exceeded the statutory maximums, and that the sentence
was subject to review even though Stone did not object at the
time of sentencing. 98 Stone was sentenced to five years on each
count of his felony animal cruelty charge to run concurrently.99
After reviewing the statute,100 the court held that the sentence
exceeded the statutory parameters, reversed the trial court's
sentence and-remanded the case for resentencing. 10 1
92. Id. $ 39.
93. Id. On appeal, Stone conceded that the officers had probable cause to be on his
property. Id. 19.
94. Stone, 41, citing State v. Burke, 235 Mont. 165, 171, 766 P.2d 254, 257 (1988)
(holding that a probationer has a reduced privacy interest because they are aware that
their activities will be scrutinized).
95. Id. 42.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. 45, citing State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979) (holding
that the Montana Supreme Court should review sentences that exceed the statutory
mandates).
99. Id. $$ 43-44.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-211(2)(a) (2001). The statute provides in part:
(a) A person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of cruelty to animals
shall be fined not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned in the state prison for a
term not to exceed 2 years, or both.
101. Stone, $ 48.
Vol. 66272
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This case marks the rare recognition by the Montana
Supreme Court of a new although narrow exigent circumstance
justifying a warrantless search. Previously, an exigent
circumstance was deemed to exist only "if the situation at hand
would cause a reasonable person to believe that prompt action is
necessary to prevent physical harm to an officer or other person,
the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of a suspect, or
some other consequence improperly frustrating law enforcement
efforts.' 10 2  State v. Stone offers hope and uncertainty for
prosecutors and law enforcement officials. While the decision
indicates a willingness on the part of the Montana Supreme
Court to expand the list of exigent circumstances which would
justify a warrantless search it also creates further confusion as
to what will qualify as an exigent circumstance in the future.
-Jeffrey D. Perkins
4. IN THE MATTER OFA.S.10 3
In the Matter of A.S. addresses whether parents have a due
process right to effective assistance of counsel in proceedings to
terminate parental rights. 0 4  This issue was one of first
impression for the Montana Supreme Court.105
M.S. was the natural mother of A.S. 10 6 Shortly after birth,
A.S. tested positive for cocaine, and M.S. tested positive for
marijuana. 10 7 Following a search of M.S.'s home, additional
drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. 08 Due to the search
and drug test results, the Montana Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) was awarded temporary legal custody of
A.S. on June 15, 2001.109 Following a hearing in which A.S. was
adjudicated a youth in need of care, HHS's temporary custody
was extended for six months. 110 A treatment plan was approved
for M.S., which she consequently failed to comply with on
several levels."' On October 9, 2002, over a year after being
102. Id. 18, citing State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, 24, 287 Mont. 220, 24, 953
P.2d 1065, 24.
103. 2004 MT 62, 320 Mont. 268, 87 P.3d 408.
104. Id. T 3, 13.
105. Id. 13.
106. Id. 1.
107. Id. 4.
108. Id.
109. A.S., 77 4-5.
110. Id. 7 5.
111. Id. VI 5-7.
2005 273
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awarded temporary legal custody of A.S., HHS filed a petition to
have M.S.'s parental rights terminated. 112
The district court conducted a hearing on the petition on
January 7, 2003.113 On January 21, 2003, the district court
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, terminating M.S.'s
parental rights as to A.S. 114 Shortly thereafter, on January 23,
2003, M.S. appealed the district court's decision to the Montana
Supreme Court. 115
On appeal, M.S. claimed to have been denied effective
assistance of counsel.116 M.S.'s assertion was based on the fact
that her court-appointed counsel failed to subpoena witnesses to
testify on her behalf at the termination hearing.11 7  In a
unanimous opinion, written by Justice Regnier, the court stated
that it is firmly established in Montana that a natural parent's
right to care and custody of his or her child is a fundamental
liberty interest requiring fundamentally fair procedures 118 so
that a parent must be afforded a right to counsel at a
termination proceeding. 19 However, in this case, the court
recognized that it had yet to address the issue of whether or not
such counsel must be effective. 20 Thus, the court initially
addressed whether M.S. was entitled to receive effective
assistance of counsel at the termination proceeding. 121
The Montana Supreme Court noted that other states have
addressed similar issues, and held that parents have a right to
effective assistance of counsel in termination proceedings. 22
The court stated that a similar issue had been addressed in
Kane v. Miller. 23 In Kane, the court had addressed whether a
mother, whose parental rights had been terminated, had a cause
of legal malpractice against her court-appointed counsel. 24 The
112. Id. 18.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. A.S., 8
116. Id. 11.
117. Id.
118. Id. 1 12 (citing Matter of A.S.A., 258 Mont. 194, 197, 852 P.2d 127, 129 (1993)
(citations omitted); In re A.C. 2001 MT 126, 20, 305 Mont. 404, 7 20, 27 P.3d 960, IT
20).
119. Id. (citing In re Custody of M.W., 2001 MT 78, 7[ 25, 305 Mont. 80, 91 25, 23
P.3d 206, 25; In re A.F.-C., 2001 MT 283, 1 42, 307 Mont. 358, 42, 37 P.3d 724, 42).
120. Id. 1 13.
121. A.S., 13.
122. Id. 17 14-16 (citations omitted).
123. Id. 71 17 (citing Kane v. Miller, 258 Mont. 182, 852 P.2d 130 (1993)).
124. Id. If 18 (citing Kane, 258 Mont. at 187, 852 P.2d at 133).
274 Vol. 66
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issue of whether a parent is entitled to effective legal assistance
was not specifically addressed. 125 However, by evaluating the
adequacy of the mother's legal representation at her termination
proceeding, it was implicit that she was entitled to effective
representation. 126 Thus, the court concluded that parents have a
right to effective assistance of counsel in termination
proceedings. 127
Following its conclusion in regard to the requirement of
effective counsel, the court proceeded to determine the
appropriate standard by which to gauge whether counsel has
indeed been effective. 28 In criminal proceedings, the court
applies a two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington.129
However, in a prior proceeding the court determined that the
Strickland test is not applicable to civil proceedings involving
involuntary commitment. 30 The court based -its prior decision
on the fact that "the standard under Strickland simply does not
go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals ...
,,131 In the present case, the court similarly found that the
Strickland test does not go far enough to protect the liberty
interests of individuals who stand to lose their parental
rights. 132 Thus, the Strickland test was not applied to test the
claims of ineffective counsel arising out of termination
proceedings. 133
After declining to apply a general standard for legal
malpractice, the court elected to formulate a standard
specifically tailored to the instant issue. 34  To evaluate
effectiveness of counsel in cases involving the termination of
parental rights, the court set out the following non-exclusive
factors:
(1) Training and experience. Specifically, whether counsel has
experience and training in representing parents in matters and
proceedings under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 6, Montana Code
Annotated, and whether counsel has a verifiably competent
125. Id.
126. Id. [ 19.
127. A.S., 20.
128. Id. 21.
129. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
130. Id. 22 (citing In re K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, 1 33, 306 Mont. 1, 1 33, 29 P.3d
485, 33).
131. Id. If 22 (citing K.G.F., IT 33).
132. Id. 1 23.
133. A.S. 1 23.
134. Id. 24.
2005 275
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understanding of the statutory and case law involving Title 41,
Chapter 3, Montana Code Annotated, and of termination
proceedings brought under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 6, Montana
Code Annotated; and
(2) Advocacy. This inquiry includes whether counsel has
adequately investigated the case; whether counsel has timely and
sufficiently met with the parent and has researched the applicable
law; whether counsel has prepared for the termination hearing by
interviewing the State's witnesses and by discovering and
reviewing documentary evidence that might be introduced; and
whether counsel has demonstrated that he or she possesses trial
skills, including making appropriate objections, producing
evidence and calling and cross-examining witnesses and
experts. 135
The court then applied the benchmark factors to M.S.'s case by
noting her counsel had originally been prepared to represent
M.S. at a termination hearing set for October 22, 2002.136 When
the hearing was re-scheduled for January 7, 2003, counsel
admittedly neglected to place the re-scheduled termination
hearing on his calendar. 137 He requested a continuance in order
to re-subpoena the witnesses he had subpoenaed at an earlier
hearing. 138 Counsel also attempted to admit letters written by
the missing witnesses. 139 The district court denied counsel's
request for a continuance, and disallowed the letters as
hearsay. 140 The hearing was then concluded as scheduled. 141
Based on the chronology of events, and using the factors
established above, the court determined that counsel was not
adequately prepared for the hearing. 42  Counsel did not
zealously advocate for M.S., and such advocacy was not beyond
his means as he had been prepared to represent M.S. at the
October 22nd hearing. 43
Finally, the court addressed whether M.S. was prejudiced as
a result of counsel's ineffectiveness. 44 M.S. asserted that she
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to subpoena witnesses to
135. Id. 26 (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 22-23 (1995); K.G.F., 70-89).
136. Id. 29.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. A.S., 29.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. 30.
143. Id.
144. Id. 31.
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testify on her behalf. 145  However, the witnesses subpoenaed
were slated to testify as to M.S's conduct during her pregnancy
and prior to the time A.S. was removed from her care. 146 Such
information was no longer relevant to M.S.'s case because the
relevant issue at the termination hearing was whether M.S. had
completed her treatment plan.147 Thus, testimony regarding
M.S.'s conduct during her pregnancy, and prior to the time A.S.
was removed, was irrelevant to the district court's ultimate
ruling. 148
The court concluded that although M.S. did not receive
effective assistance of counsel, she did not suffer prejudice as a
result of counsel's ineffectiveness.149 The decision of the district
court terminating M.S.'s parental rights to A.S. was affirmed.
50
Although the district court's termination of M.S.'s parental
rights remained undisturbed in the end, In the Matter of A.S.
firmly establishes that effective legal counsel is a minimum
requirement for a parent facing parental termination actions.
Furthermore, for the first time, criteria of training, experience,
and advocacy skills necessary to an attorney's effective
representation in parental rights termination cases have now
been established in Montana jurisprudence.
-Megan Heahlke
5. CAMPBELL V. GARDEN CITY PLUMBING & HEATING, INC.
1 5 1
In Campbell v. Garden City Plumbing & Heating, Inc., the
Montana Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not prove
sexual discrimination in a same-sex sexual harassment case
because he did not produce evidence that his co-workers acted
with a discriminatory motive based on his gender. 52
In February of 1999, Travis Campbell started work for
Garden City Plumbing and Heating (Garden City). 53
Throughout the course of his employment, he was periodically
subjected to vulgar and sexually explicit comments made by
145. A.S., V 32.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. 33.
150. Id.
151. 2004 MT 231, 322 Mont. 434, 97 P.3d 546.
152. Id. 24-25.
153. Id. 5.
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other Garden City employees. 154 While such behavior was
sometimes directed toward other employees, Campbell, as the
newest member of the plumbing crew, "was barraged with
offensive sex-themed comments."'155 The comments included his
much larger foreman telling Campbell that he turned down sex
with his wife because he knew he could have sex with Campbell
and often stated that he was going to "butt fuck" Campbell. 156
Further, in one instance, the foreman straddled a ditch in which
Campbell was digging, motioned to his crotch, and told
Campbell that he "was the 'perfect height' for giving him
pleasure."'157 Campbell finally asked one of his supervisors if he
could turn in another male co-worker for sexual harassment.'58
The supervisor's response was that Campbell could file a
complaint, but "he would probably not live to testify."' 59
Campbell began calling in sick, then finally quit work at Garden
City because of the harassment.160
Campbell then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
Montana Department of Labor and Industry, alleging his co-
workers and superiors had discriminated against him because of
his sex.' 61 The Department of Labor held a hearing in which it
found that the "[c]ourse, vulgar, sexually-explicit taunting
actually occurred," and that "the number of them and the degree
of vulgarity and violence embodied with them" wore on
Campbell and caused him to fear that the threatened incidents
might occur. 162  However, the Department dismissed the
petition, and Campbell appealed to the Montana Human Rights
Commission, which affirmed the Department's dismissal. 63
Finally, Campbell filed a petition in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Missoula County, for judicial review of the Human Rights
Commission's decision. 164  The district court affirmed the
decision, agreeing with the hearing examiner that "'Campbell
failed to prove that his harassers either were hostile toward men
154. Id. 79 5, 9.
155. Id. 6.
156. Id. 31 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
157. Campbell, 31 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
158. Id. 7.
159. Id.
160. Id. 8.
161. Id. 4.
162. Id. 79 4, 9.
163. Campbell, 4.
164. Id. 7 1, 4.
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generally or acting out sexual desires toward him."16 5 Campbell
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing that the
hearing officer, the Human Rights Commission, and the district
court had erred in deciding Campbell was not discriminated
against because of his sex. 1
66
The Montana Supreme Court first noted that the issue of
same-sex sexual harassment was a matter of first impression in
Montana jurisprudence. 167 However, the court recognized that
the U.S. Supreme Court had conclusively determined that same-
sex sexual harassment claims were within the provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it decided the case of
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.168  The court
reasoned that reference to Oncale was appropriate to Campbell's
claim since the Montana Human Rights Act, Title 49, Montana
Code Annotated, are parallel to the provisions of Title VII. 169 In
so doing, the court adopted the holding of Oncale to Montana.
170
In Montana, two basic forms of sexual harassment may
violate prohibitions against workplace discrimination, the first
being quid pro quo and the second being hostile work
environment harassment.' 7' Campbell's claim fell into the
second category in alleging a hostile working environment.
172
The court opined that a plaintiff claiming sexual harassment via
a hostile work environment must establish a prima facie case
through the proof of four essential elements:'
73
1. the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class (male or
female);
2. the plaintiff must show that the offensive conduct amounted
to actual discrimination because of sex and that the
motivation behind the discrimination was clearly based on
the plaintiffs sex;
3. the plaintiff must show that the harassment was unwelcome;
and
4. the plaintiff must show that the claimed sexual harassment
165. Id. 4, 22.
166. Id. 2.
167. Id. 11.
168. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
169. Campbell, 11-12.
170. Id. 11.
171. Id. 15 (citing Beaver v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation, 2003 MT
287, 29, 318 Mont. 35, 29, 78 P.3d 857, 29).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of
his employment and created an abusive working
environment. 174
The court determined that Campbell easily met requirements
one and three because he fell within the protected class of male,
and he demonstrated that the harassment was unwelcome. 175
However, the court determined that Campbell fell short of
proving a case of sexual harassment because he could not meet
the second requirement, which required proof of some
discriminatory motive that was based on his sex. 176 The court
stated that a plaintiff must "'prove that the conduct at issue was
not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but
actually constituted discrimination ... because of ... sex."' 177 In
short, "a plaintiff must prove the motivation behind the
discrimination was clearly based on the plaintiffs sex."' 78
The court did agree with Campbell's argument that "neither
proof of sexual desire nor proof of sexual stereotyping is required
to establish discrimination based on sex."1 79  Campbell
attempted to prove his claim by asserting that his co-workers'
actions discriminated against him as a man because the
comments directed toward him were the sort that would be
especially degrading to a heterosexual male. 8 0 But the court
stated that Campbell had confused the fourth prima facie
element of his claim with the second by "claiming that proof of
an intimidating work environment constitutes proof of
discrimination because of sex."'181
The court turned again to the Supreme Court's decision in
Oncale where it "warned that Title VII was not to be denuded
into a 'general civility code' . . . [by] mistak[ing] ordinary
socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or
intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory 'conditions of
employment."' 82 In deciding that Campbell had failed to prove
his claim, the court stated:
174. Id. 16-19.
175. Campbell, 20.
176. Id. 21 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998)).
177. Id. 17 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
178. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
179. Id. 21.
180. Id. 22.
181. Campbell, 24
182. Id. 23 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
280 Vol. 66
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/9
LEGAL SHORTS
It cannot be gainsaid that the conduct perpetrated upon Campbell
by his coworkers, and allowed by management, was infantile and
decidedly pusillanimous. Yet, while it is unfortunate that
Campbell was subjected to such puerile conduct, Campbell did not
prove that the conduct rose to the level of discrimination based on
sex. 183
Because the court held that Campbell failed to prove that his co-
workers harassed him because of his sex, it declined further
analysis of the fourth element and affirmed the district court. 8 4
Justice Leaphart dissented in this case, joined by Justices
Nelson and Cotter.18 5 Justice Leaphart rec6gnized that the
plaintiff would ' have to meet the four requirements, but
questioned the majority's decision that Campbell did not meet
the second requirement. 8 6  He illustrated his point with
examples of some of the behavior to which Campbell was
subjected.187 Justice Leaphart stated that the Garden City
employees' behavior was anything but "ordinary socializing in
the workplace"; rather, he thought a threat by a 225-pound man
to have nonconsensual anal sex with a man half his size
demonstrated motive of gender-based discrimination on its
face.188 Justice Leaphart stated that if such egregious behavior
does not rise to the level of same-sex sexual harassment, he
questioned what amount of sexually explicit, hostile and abusive
conduct a person must endure in the workplace before relief is
warranted. 8 9 Justice Leaphart would have reversed the district
court's decision and allowed Campbell to pursue a case of sexual
harassment in furtherance of good public policy. 90
Although the same-sex sexual harassment claim in
Campbell was unsuccessful, Campbell serves to establish for the
first time in Montana jurisprudence the essential prima facie
proof elements necessary for a plaintiff to sustain a
discrimination claim based on same-sex sexual harassment
resulting in a hostile work environment.
-Jessica J. Penkal
183. Id.
184. Id. 9 25-26.
185. Id. TT 27-34 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
186. Id. TT 28-29 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
187. Campbell, T 31 (Leaphart, J., dissenting); see also textual information related
to supra notes 6-7.
188. Id. 32 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
189. Id. TT 32-33 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
190. Id. TT 32-34 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
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